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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D. C. 20505

26 September 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary,
National Security Council

SUBJECT: White House Digest:
The 1984 Elections in Sandinista Nicaragua

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum of 25 September 1984,
Same Subject

We have only one comment:

Page 12, first paragraph - Even though his name is misspelled in the source cited, the Secretary General of the European Democratic Union is Andreas Kohl - not Khol.

STAT

Executive Secretary

cc: Charles Hill
Executive Secretary
Department of State

Col. R. J. Affourtit
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

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Remarks

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
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Executive Secretary

25 Sep 84
Date

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

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September 25, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL R.J. AFFOURTIT
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

STAT

SUBJECT: White House Digest on Sandinista Elections

The attached White House Digest is submitted for final review/clearance from your agency. Please provide comments by September 27, 1984.


Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment:


White House Digest

C-387

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 20, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: JACKIE TILLMAN
FROM: Edward A. Lynch 
SUBJECT: White House Digest on Sandinista elections

Please find attached the revised edition of the White House Digest entitled: "The 1984 Elections in Sandinista Nicaragua." This draft includes the comments made by State, Defense and CIA during the first round of clearance.

The draft is also updated to include the efforts by Arturo Cruz and the Democratic Coordinating Board to find a method of participating in the elections.

Please initiate the formal clearance process. I cannot emphasize enough the importance of getting this Digest published as soon as possible. With each week that goes by, some of its impact is lost.

Thank you for your help.

THE 1984 ELECTIONS IN SANDINISTA NICARAGUA

"The reality of political liberty consists in the details and the substance of actual institutions."
Reflections on Government
Ernest Barker

"We have not promised the elections that they think we are going to promote, and we are never going to discuss power."

Humberto Ortega
Sandinista Defense Minister
August 25, 1981

In 1979, Sandinista promises of a mixed economy, respect for human rights, and the institution of democracy, including the "first truly free elections in our country in this century," led many people both in and out of Nicaragua to support Sandinismo enthusiastically.

On February 21, 1984, the FSLN (Frente Sandinista por la Liberacion de Nicaragua), Nicaragua's non-elected ruling party, announced that elections will be held on November 4, 1984. In so doing, the Communist-led regime is trying to convince foreign observers that it is moving toward keeping promises made in 1979.

The Sandinistas hope to garner world attention and, one assumes, international approval, by submitting themselves to the test of elections. But the Sandinistas see these elections as a "gift" bestowed by the Revolution rather than as a basic human right which belongs to the Nicaraguan people. As a gift, the election is neither an expression of the popular will nor a check on the power of the rulers.

The current laws governing elections and the operations of political parties are unlikely to produce the kind of open political process that one normally associates with democracy. The rules of the game are clearly stacked in favor of the ruling Sandinista party.

Why Elections?

The Sandinistas have much to gain by holding elections, especially if they can rig the process to insure a Sandinista victory. Victory in elections which are perceived to be truly democratic would convey to the ruling junta a level of international legitimacy hitherto unachievable. Those friendly to the regime will become even more supportive and critics will feel pressure to concede the Sandinistas' right to govern.

THE SANDINISTA VIEW OF ELECTIONS

Close examination of the Political Parties Law and the Electoral Law reveals how the Sandinistas plan to stack the deck. The electoral process developed by the Sandinistas deserves at least the same scrutiny as the 1984 Salvadoran elections, and the elections recently held in Guatemala.

Although the Sandinistas published their political parties decree in the September 13, 1983 issue of their official legal journal, La Gaceta, there has been little discussion or analysis of the legal regulations that will govern the existence and activities of political parties in Nicaragua.

Of interest are both the statements of dissatisfaction from opposition elements and, more importantly, the statements of prominent Sandinistas indicating disdain, almost contempt, for free elections as a measure of the people's will.

Humberto Ortega, Sandinista Defense Minister, was quoted in 1981 as saying: "Keep firmly in your mind that these elections are to consolidate revolutionary power, not to place it at stake."¹ He reiterated this view in 1983 when he said the Nicaraguan² people already had had their revolution and had chosen the FSLN.

Daniel Ortega, the coordinator of the junta, has a similar attitude. In July 1983, on the fourth anniversary of the Sandinista takeover, he declared that: "Neither bullets nor ballots" would defeat the FSLN. Another disquieting statement: "with their blood and with their guns in their hands the people have cast their votes."³

What the Sandinistas tell Western observers they are going to promote and what they are really promoting are, in their own words, two different things: "We have not promised the elections that they [the bourgeoisie] think we are going to promote, and we are never going to discuss power, as we have already said on other occasions through the National Directorate, because this power was taken by the people with arms, and here the power of the people will never be questioned."⁴

A recent example of Sandinista duplicity can be found in this statement by Sergio Ramirez: "The Nicaraguan people will have to choose and vote one candidate.⁵ That candidate is the revolution. This is very important." His position has apparently changed little since 1980, when he said: "The election that took place with the rifles in Nicaragua were the most authentic in all Latin America."⁶

As recently as May 1984, just before the current electoral process got under way, a leader of the Sandinista junta again cast aspersions on the need for elections to gauge public opinion. Bayardo Arce, who oversees the process, said at an internal

meeting of the Nicaraguan Socialist Party, a Marxist-Leninist Party:

"What a revolution needs is the power to enforce. This power to enforce is precisely what constitutes the defense of the dictatorship of the proletariat -- the ability of the class to impose its will using the instruments at hand, without going into formal or bourgeois details. From that point of view, the elections are bothersome to us."

He went on to ask: "Why should we Communists wear different shirts, if in any case a real and concrete socialism is being built through the Sandinista Front's strategy?"⁸

At the same meeting, Arce acknowledged that external pressure had caused the Sandinistas to initiate the elections process. He said:

"Of course, if we didn't have the state of war that the United States has imposed on us, the electoral problem would be something absolutely out of place."⁹

The only possible good that could come from the elections, according to Arce, is the legitimacy they might confer to the Sandinistas. He predicted that a Sandinista victory would result in a "red constitution," the removal of the "facade of political pluralism," and the establishment of "the party of the revolutionary, the single party."¹⁰

THE RECORD SO FAR: CAUSE FOR SKEPTICISM

If the only candidate is to be "the revolution," it is very important to know what defines Nicaragua's revolution.

Probably the most definitive statement regarding this matter can be found in a speech by Humberto Ortega, Sandinista Minister of Defense, to the elite corps of the Sandinista Army on August 25, 1981. He said:

"...Marxism-Leninism is the scientific doctrine which guides our revolution, the instrument of analysis of our vanguard to understand the historical process and to create the revolution; Sandinismo is the concrete expression of the historical development of the struggle in Nicaragua, without Sandinismo we cannot be Marxist-Leninists and Sandinismo without Marxism-Leninism cannot be revolutionary, and because of that our moral strength is Sandinismo, our political strength is Sandinismo, and our doctrine is that of Marxism-Leninism."¹¹

The revolution is Marxist-Leninist; the only candidate is the revolution; neither "bullets nor ballots" will defeat the Sandinistas. In this context, will elections be free and fair and competitive? Will opposition parties have a genuine opportunity to contest power?

Will the people of Nicaragua be participating in a process that reflects their legitimate and longstanding desire for genuine democracy? Or will they once again be betrayed by the Sandinistas?

THE POLITICAL PARTIES DECREE

The decree which governs political parties is a discouraging signal that the Sandinistas are not willing to incur the risk of losing power in fair, free and competitive democratic elections.

According to the political parties decree as currently written, while political parties may exist and have rights, they also have certain duties, compliance with which determines the ability of parties to exist, to be suspended or cancelled. The council with the authority to¹² make these determinations is controlled by the Sandinistas.

The ANPP and the CNPP.

To oversee matters relating to political parties two councils are established, the National Assembly of Political Parties (ANPP) and the National Council of Political Parties (CNPP). The ANPP is a consultative body which meets twice a year to make recommendations to the CNPP. It is possible that the opposition parties will be able to dominate this body since its membership is composed of one representative from each political party and one member named by the Sandinista junta.¹³

The second organization, the CNPP, clearly is dominated by the Sandinistas and has actual day-to-day authority over a number of important operations significant to the fair and free functioning of parties. The CNPP is a deliberative body which meets every fifteen days to administer laws, to resolve all questions related to political parties, to suspend and cancel parties and to implement resolutions.

The CNPP consists of eight members: four named by the consultative ANPP, three named by the Sandinista-controlled Council of State, and a Presiding Officer named by the Sandinista junta. The duties of the Presiding Officer are: to preside over both the ANPP and the CNPP, which he represents legally, to convene meetings of the CNPP, to enforce CNPP resolutions, and in case of a tie in CNPP deliberations to have two votes.¹⁴

The arithmetic is quite simple: total membership equals eight, with nine possible votes. The Sandinistas are assured of five votes, more if any of the ANPP representatives are Sandinistas or affiliated with the Sandinistas. Sandinista control is certain, and they submit their control to no risk.

Political Parties

Parties are described as "groups of Nicaraguan citizens supporting a similar ideology" that "seek .. political power for the purpose of carrying out a program that responds to the needs of national development."¹⁵ Parties may organize freely without any ideological restrictions although a return to Somocismo is prohibited.

The decree states further that only those groups recognized as political parties will enjoy rights and guarantees spelled out in the law. Parties can be ruled by their own principles and aims with the following caveats: they must respect the laws which replaced Nicaragua's Constitution when the Sandinistas came to power in July 1979, as well as the fundamental principles of the Sandinista people's revolution, such as "anti-imperialism and its deeply popular and democratic character."¹⁶

These caveats are all vague and open to wide interpretation. The requirement to defend the principles of the Sandinista revolution is one such provision. If the Sandinista principles are those ostensibly supported by the FSLN when they came to power in 1979, then the ruling party itself should be immediately disqualified.

Parties enjoy a full range of rights, such as disseminating ideological principles, conducting propaganda aimed at enlisting members, and holding private and public meetings. They will be allowed to criticize the public administration and propose solutions, to form alliances with other parties, to raise funds, to own assets, to maintain party offices, to participate in elections, to request representation in the Council of State and accredit representatives to the ANPP.

Access to media during elections -- there is no mention of access to media when elections are not underway -- is assured "in accordance with the legislation in effect at the time."¹⁷ This is most likely a reminder that the current State of Emergency and the consequent limitation of rights may influence the ability of parties to have access to the media. This clause could also refer to the regulations placed on parties by the Sandinista CNPP. There are other laws as well that restrict freedom to campaign.

RIGHTS AND DUTIES, SUSPENSION AND CANCELLATION

Tying rights to duties illuminates the coercive control that the Sandinistas want over the opposition political parties. Tomas Borge, Sandinista Minister of the Interior, explained the relations between duties and rights in a discussion of media access during elections.

"As every right entails duties, the parties must be responsible for their use of this right. This means they will not be able to denigrate or slander the revolutionary

process under the protection of this provision. In other words, they will not be able to use it as a trench from which to wage destruction or to try to make the irreversible wheel of history go back."¹⁸

This statement makes clear the intent of the Sandinistas that any activity deemed to be "outside the revolution," will either not be permitted or a huge cost -- the right to exist as a party -- will be paid. The revolution from which they are not allowed to stray is a Marxist-Leninist revolution.

In the political parties decree, a whole host of "duties" are listed, including:

- to comply with the country's laws
- to comply with resolutions passed by the CNPP
- to promote and endorse the patriotic unity
- to contribute to the "consolidation of the political, social and economic conquests achieved by our people."
- to defend the revolution against internal/external attempts to establish a regime characterized by the oppression and exploitation of the Nicaraguan revolution
- to fight to preserve the country's freedom and independence and to defend national sovereignty and the right of self-determination
- to sponsor and promote human rights
- to answer for activities carried out individually as parties, or in alliance with other parties
- ¹⁹ to accredit a permanent representative to the Council of State.

In the event the CNPP determines that a political party has not fulfilled the legal duties as listed in the decree, the CNPP has the authority to suspend (prohibit operation) of the party for a specific period of time. Repeated noncompliance with the duties can result in cancellation, which the decree describes as the dissolution of the party.

In addition, parties can also be cancelled for participating in "activities which harm the public order and the stability of the institutions of the Government of National Reconstruction."²⁰

The list of citizens and organizations that have been repressed in Nicaragua because the Sandinistas decided an action "harmed public order" is a long one. For example, four members of the Nicaraguan private sector umbrella organization, COSEP, were jailed in October 1981 for merely writing a letter to the Sandinistas protesting unfair confiscations and the Marxist-Leninist trend of the regime.

If the record of the Sandinistas gives any clue, the insertion of this restriction in the decree once again indicates that the Sandinistas -- the arbiters of what is harmful to the

public order -- are assured total coercive control over the parties.

FINAL RECOURSE TO THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE

In the event there is disagreement regarding resolutions passed by the CNPP, a party may appeal to the Supreme Court of Justice for revision. But this offers no real recourse or protection. Although the Supreme Court has exhibited a marginal degree of independence since July 1979, it too was "reorganized" after the Sandinista triumph.

It is sobering to note the following statements made by two Sandinista Supreme Court magistrates, Dr. Roberto Arguello Hurtado and Dr. Hernado Zuniga, after an eight day visit to the Soviet Union in October 1982 to "exchange experiences with Soviet officials." According to Radio Sandino:

"Dr. Arguello said that the Soviet legal system is one of the most advanced and best organized systems in the world. He said one of the most impressive aspects is that of human rights in health and education, two of the most advanced human rights guarantees in the Soviet Union."²¹

Dr. Zuniga stated that: "We had many opportunities to gain legal experiences in the Soviet Union. We visited a number of State organizations charged with administering justice and we were able to observe the advanced level of laws, the respect for the law and the administration of justice."²²

THE ELECTORAL LAW

The attitude of the Supreme Court of Justice is important. They are the final arbiters of disputes under the Political Parties Law. This body also chooses, subject to the ratification of the Council of State, the members of the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE), which is the highest authority in electoral matters.²³

The authority of the Council is broad and their resolutions are not subject to any ordinary or special appeal.²⁴ This non-elected, non-accountable body appoints the members of local and regional councils, set a 13 week limit to campaigning, and oversaw the registration of candidates and of citizens. Most importantly, this Sandinista-dominated body will carry out the national vote count.²⁵

Inspectors of political parties can be present during the registration of electors and during the vote count but, if they refuse to sign the voting record, perhaps because they are not satisfied with the accuracy of the count, this refusal does not invalidate it.²⁶

The Council also has the right to demarcate electoral districts. They therefore have the opportunity to gerrymander the lines to insure pro-Sandinista majorities. These decisions are made by administrative resolution, requiring only a majority vote.²⁷

Registration of voters is done under Council auspices. All Nicaraguan citizens were required to register between July 27 and July 30. This was a week before the campaign officially started on August 8. Opposition parties argue that this did not allow citizens to hear their message before going to register and that registration could have been carried out more effectively during the campaign.²⁸

The Media

Probably the most debilitating limitation on opposition political parties is the restricted access to mass media. The people of Nicaragua have had their information completely censored for two years. During that time, all television and most radio stations have been government controlled and the sole remaining independent newspaper frequently has been muzzled.

During the 13 week campaign, opposition parties will have to divide 30 minutes of television air time per day on both channels of the Sandinista Television Network.²⁹ This means that opposition parties will have to divide less than 100 hours of air time, after years of uninterrupted Sandinista propaganda.

The situation on radio is not much better. One of the only independent radio stations left is run by the Archdiocese of Managua. Under the Electoral Law, religious radio stations may not participate in political campaigning or accept contracts for that purpose. Only 45 minutes per day, again to be divided among the parties, is available on the State radio system.³⁰

Public demonstrations are permitted but must be cleared through the Supreme Electoral Council. They are forbidden during the current State of Emergency, as is the distribution of leaflets, the posting of campaign literature and the purchase of a newspaper, radio, or television advertisements. Barricada editor Carlos Chamorro summed up the official attitude toward media pluralism in 1983 when he said: "In Nicaragua there is no essential need to hear the other point of view."³¹

The chances for opposition parties to make real gains run into Sandinista-mandated obstacles at every turn. The ruling party, apparently having grown accustomed to an utter lack of opposition, is so uncomfortable with the idea that another point of view will be heard that they are taking extraordinary steps to muffle it.

Although the Sandinistas profess confidence in their ability to stay in power through the electoral process, they find it

necessary to legally protect the "stability of the institutions" of the regime they have constructed since July 1979. It could be that they have not forgotten the results of a poll taken by La Prensa in late 1981 (before it was so heavily censored) conducted in Nicaragua's major urban areas.

Even in areas presumed to be Sandinista strongholds, the poll indicated that only 8% of those polled considered themselves Marxist-Leninists, 30.5% felt better than before the revolution, 22.3% felt worse and 41.8% felt the same. This is an indication that two and a half years after the Triumph, when the poll was taken, only thirty or so percent had felt an improvement in their lives.³²

Sandinista repression has been intense since 1981 -- brutal attacks on the Church, mocking the Pope, and severe repression of the Miskito Indians, free trade unions, the one independent newspaper, political parties, private enterprise, to name just a few examples. If a freely conducted poll in Nicaragua were possible today, it would show even more serious disaffection with the Sandinistas. But polls cannot be taken without government approval.

THE POSSIBILITY OF A BOYCOTT

Opposition parties have found little of merit in the Sandinista proposal. Veterans of the struggle for democracy against the Somoza regime recall that Somoza too, used to stage elections to give his regime the outward appearance of democracy.

Enrique Bolanos, head of the Superior Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP), was quoted recently as saying: "They [the FSLN] are doing this just to put up a front and fool the world."³³ Agustin Jarquin, head of the Social Christian Party, said recently: "In the present situation, we do not have the conditions for participating."³⁴

Opposition parties, as well as individuals, have expressed doubts about the electoral process. The Social Democratic Party issued a proclamation on January 28, 1984 which reads in part:

"We believe that political pluralism, much less electoral activity, cannot exist if a genuine system of liberty of expression and dissemination of thought is not implemented and if use of and access [to media] is not available to each and every party on an equal basis."³⁵

Even some former officials of the Sandinista government have been critical of the Sandinistas' electoral decisions. Says Alfredo Cesar, who served in the Sandinista government until May 1982:

"More than four months have passed since elections were announced, and we are only six months away from election day. Yet the participation of the opposition is not yet guaranteed. The electoral council, already named, contains

only members of the Sandinista front. Press censorship is in full effect. I experienced it personally when reports on my trip to Managua were censored. Finally, and most important, an emergency law prohibited political activities remains in force."³⁶

Members of the Sandinista ruling junta, such as Sergio Ramirez, have emphasized that there are seven parties participating in the election, including the FSLN, and that this indicates true political pluralism and a genuine choice for the people of Nicaragua.³⁷

What Ramirez does not mention is that three of the six "opposition" parties are Marxist-Leninist (The Socialist Party, the Communist Party, and the "Marxist-Leninist Popular Action Party." Two of the three other parties are generally supportive of the FSLN.

Three democratic political parties (the Christian Democrats, the Social Christians and the Conservatives), the two non-Sandinista labor union centrals, and COSEP have joined together and formed an alliance called the Coordinadora Democratica. All the member organizations opposed Somoza and are now opposing the Sandinistas.

The leader and probable presidential candidate of the Coordinadora is Arturo Cruz, former head of the Central Bank in the Sandinista government. Cruz, who worked inside the Sandinista government to try to hold it to its promises to the OAS, stated recently:

"A constituent assembly could have been elected as early as 1982, with a view to having a constitution ready before the 1985 elections. That did not happen, however, and now the Sandinistas are putting the cart before the horse, scheduling presidential and legislative elections although we have no Constitution. ... The Sandinista front has not given any assurances that it is willing to surrender power if it happens to lose. ... Under these constraining conditions, ... I expect that large numbers of people will stay away from the polls."³⁸

Cruz toured Nicaragua in July and was greeted by large and enthusiastic crowds all over the country. However, Cruz has not yet negotiated acceptable terms of participation and the Coordinadora and on July 25 they refused to register a candidate and threatened a boycott.

The Coordinadora is demanding a postponement of the election to allow a longer campaign; complete press freedom; and the presence of observers from international organizations to monitor the election process from start to finish. These are the same demands that the Coordinadora has been making since last December, when serious discussion of elections began.

In mid-September 1984, Cruz visited five Latin American Presidents and then returned to Nicaragua. Upon his return to Nicaragua, he again tried to reach an accommodation with the Sandinistas and was reportedly assisted³⁹ by the mediation of Colombian President Belisario Betancur. (Colombia is one of the Contadora countries trying to find a peaceful solution to the Central American crisis.)

According to news reports, President Betancur had talked by telephone with Cruz and Sandinista leaders but was unable to persuade the Sandinistas to postpone the elections. Said Cruz: "If they wouldn't consider the first demand, which was postponing the elections, there was no sense even talking about the other demands."⁴⁰

Efforts by the Coordinadora to participate under reasonable conditions continue. Of crucial importance to both the democratic opposition and the Sandinistas are international perceptions of their efforts. If the Sandinistas appear too rigid, the Coordinadora will gain support and its non-participation will invalidate the election in the eyes of many observers.

This will deny the Sandinistas the legitimacy they hope the elections will confer. Therefore, the Sandinistas must either ignore Cruz and the Coordinadora, with the risks that entails, discredit the coalition (which they are attempting to do), or give in to their demands and accept the very real possibility of defeat at the polls.

For the opposition coalition, perceptions are also important. If they decide they cannot participate, they must convince democratic nations that their refusal is based on reasonable objections to the electoral process as currently established. It must not look like they are being stubborn or that they fear defeat in a free election.

CONCLUSION

The political parties law is carefully designed to permit no threat to continued Sandinista rule and does not allow genuine electoral freedom such as that embodied in the Constitution of the United States and the laws of other democratic states.

One measure of how far a regime has progressed toward the goal of democracy is the willingness of the ruling party to admit to the possibility of being replaced peacefully, through elections. Such a transition took place in El Salvador in 1982, and again on June 1st of this year.

If the Sandinistas continue to stonewall the democratic opposition, they risk exposing their "elections" as nothing more than a plebiscite on the totalitarian model. This would cost the regime valuable diplomatic support in Western Europe.

The erosion of European support has already begun. Andreas Khol, the Secretary General of the European Democratic Union, is a member of an international mission overseeing Sandinista preparations for elections and he has concluded that "the upcoming Nicaraguan elections will not be free." He added that the Coordinadora was right in refusing to register a candidate.⁴¹

The Sandinistas are making every attempt to make certain that there is no transfer of power after the elections, regardless of the will of the people. It is an indication of the insecurity of the Sandinistas that they feel the need to include so many safeguards to insure their own victory.

ENDNOTES

1. Henri Weber, Nicaragua: the Sandinist Revolution (London, U.K.: Verso Editions, 1981) p. 75
2. Barricada, 11 July 1980
3. The Economist 10 May 1980 p. 22
4. Humberto Ortega, Sandinista Defense Minister, in a speech to the Sandinista military, 25 August 1981, quoted by Branko Lazitch in Est et Ouest (Paris) 25 August 1981
5. Managua Domestic Service 14 January 1984 (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, hereinafter FBIS, 16 January, 1984 p. P20)
6. Diario Las Americas 16 December, 1980.
7. Juan O. Tamayo, "Election bothersome, Managua official says," The Miami Herald, 8 August 1984 p. 1
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Humberto Ortega, Speech to the Sandinista Military, op. cit.
12. The Political Parties Decree was published in Barricada, the official Sandinista newspaper, on 15 September 1983. A translation appears in FBIS 22 September, 1983 pp. P13-21.
13. Political Parties Law, Article 10.
14. Ibid. Article 15

15. Ibid. Article 2
16. Ibid. Article 5
17. Ibid. Article 6
18. FBIS 11 May 1983 p. P13
19. Political Parties Law, Article 7
20. Ibid. Article 28
21. Managua, Radio Sandino, 25 October, 1984. FBIS, 27 October 1982 pp. P10-11
22. Ibid.
23. The Electoral Law was published in La Gaceta on 28 March 1984 and in Barricada the same day. The English translation appears in FBIS 6 April 1984 pp. 22-45. Passage cited is in Arts. 3-4.
24. Ibid. Art. 9
25. Ibid. Art. 7
26. Ibid. Art. 22
27. Ibid. Arts. 26 & 64
28. "Nicaraguan Council Announces Timetable for Election Campaign," Washington Post 25 May, 1984 p. A40
29. Electoral Law Art. 37
30. Ibid.
31. The New Republic 24 October, 1983 p. 10
32. Encuesta de Opinion, August 1981. Analysis of Methods, Results, and Conclusions.
33. Edward Cody, "Sandinista Foes Doubt Pledges on Elections," Washington Post 17 January 1984 p. A11
34. Ibid.
35. "Social Democratic Message to the People of Nicaragua," 28 January 1984
36. Alfredo Cesar, "Nicaragua Must seek Firm Independence," New York Times 23 April 1984
37. Washington Post 17 September, 1984 p. A 15

38. Arturo Jose Cruz, "Sandinista Democracy Unlikely," New York Times 27 January 1984

39. John Lantigua, "Managua Mediation Said to Fail," The Washington Post 19 September 1984 p. A 21

40. Ibid

41. San Jose Radio Impacto 31 August 1984 (translation in the 5 September 1985 issue of FBIS, p. P14.)

9-20-84